This paper examines the effect of HMO market development on hospital utilization in short term general hospitals in the U.S. between 1985 and 1993. HMO penetration does not explain the majority or even a substantial minority of the variation in hospital utilization. Among seven measures of hospital utilization, the association between inpatient days per capita and variation in HMO penetration is the strongest, and even for that measure, just 21% of the 9% decrease in inpatient days is attributable to HMOs. The association between HMO penetration and other utilization measures is even smaller. The results suggest that change in hospital utilization over the period 1985 to 1993 was attributable more to factors such as technological change than directly to HMOs. Health care literature has placed significant emphasis on the contribution of managed care and the introduction of PPS to changes in hospital utilization and expenditures. There is evidence suggesting that managed care reduces costs (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1995; Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai, 1994. Zwanziger and Melnick, 1996). Managed care has also been associated with decreases in length of stay, hospital admissions, hospital occupancy rates, hospital inpatient days and staffed beds (Miller and Luft, 1994). Further, it is maintained that though managed care accelerates the substitution of outpatient visits for inpatient services, markets with high HMO penetration have had a slower increase in outpatient visits compared to markets with lower HMO penetration (Robinson, 1996).
observed HMO effects are due to favorable selection. In this paper, we examine the generalizability and magnitude of the effect of HMOs on hospital use by studying the effect of HMOs on overall hospital utilization.
We estimate the amount of variation in hospital utilization across markets that is associated with the growth of HMOs. The results from multivariate OLS regressions show that the magnitude of association between HMO penetration and hospital utilization is small. Among seven measures of hospital utilization, the association between inpatient days per capita and variation in HMO penetration is the strongest. Even then, variation in HMO market structure only contributed 20.6% of the observed decrease in inpatient days. If HMO penetration stayed at its 1985 level, inpatient days per capita would have still decreased by approximately 7.2%.
The association between HMOs and the other six measures of hospital utilization was even smaller. These results come as a surprise given the emphasis in the literature, of the effect of HMOs on hospital utilization. Our research shows that changes in hospital utilization are largely associated with unobserved time varying factors. Such variation over time might be explained by changes in technology, physician practices, insurance rates and PPS. Of course it is possible that these time factors capture indirect effects of HMOs. Even so, it is remarkable that the estimates of HMOs direct effects are so small. The paper is organized as follows. Section one provides an overview of changes in the health care industry and reviews literature that investigates the relationships of these changes to hospital utilization. Section two describes the data and provides a summary of trends over time and compares them cross-sectionally. Section three provides the results of multivariate analysis on seven dependent variables: inpatient days per capita, outpatient visits per capita, (log of) occupancy rates, (log of) admissions per capita, (log of) beds per capita, and two measures of inpatient vs. outpatient activity. This section also explores some "scenarios" for hypothetical HMO penetration levels for the U.S. as a whole, and for Pennsylvania and California. Finally, this section describes the amount of variation in the dependent variables that can be associated with the independent variables. The last section summarizes the findings.
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The health care literature identifies various factors that are associated with changes in hospital utilization. Among these factors, the effects of managed care, changes in technology, and the introduction of PPS have been emphasized.
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An important institutional change over the past twenty years in the health care industry has been the rapid growth of "health maintenance organizations" (HMOs) (Christianson et al., 1991) . Managed care includes all those plans that involve a network of providers such as HMOs, preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and point of service plans (POS). The traditional indemnity, fee-for-service (FFS) plan, which includes Medicare FFS, differs from managed care. HMOs, for example, integrate the health insurance and health care services functions by providing consumers with a specified set of health services in exchange for a premium. Because HMOs face the risk of losing money if health care consumption is high, they attempt to manage the use of inputs such as inpatient days and ambulatory visits by using administrative techniques such as utilization reviews and shifting risk to providers. Miller and Luft (1994) show that hospital utilization is lower for HMOs compared to the indemnity plans. They summarize the performance of HMO versus indemnity plans since 1980 from 54 studies along 15 different measures, including (a) hospital admission rates, (b) hospital length of stay (LOS), and (c) hospital days per enrollee. Seven studies are documented with eleven observations 1 that compare admissions rates under various HMO to indemnity plans.
For eight of these observations, admission rates were lower for HMO plans. Of fifteen observations of LOS from thirteen studies, fourteen showed shorter LOS for HMOs. Similarly, for hospital days per enrollee, Miller and Luft document eight observations from six studies. All eight observations show that HMO plans had lower hospital days per enrollee.
Recent research shows comparable differences in hospital utilization under FFS and HMO enrollees. Robinson [1996] shows that admission rates and hospital length of stay sharply decreased between 1983 and 1993 in California. He analyzed hospital utilization in markets with the highest and lowest HMO penetration and found that the decline in the number of hospitals was similar in both types of markets, but the decline in inpatient utilization was more pronounced in markets with high HMO penetration. Robinson concluded that HMOs contributed to the substitution of outpatient for inpatient surgery.
Studies that analyze differences in hospital utilization among HMO and FFS enrollees are often subject to the "selection bias" problem. This occurs when the population enrolling in HMOs is systematically different from the one enrolling in indemnity FFS plans (Wilensky and Rossiter, 1986) , and the differences in population characteristics are not properly controlled for.
If unobserved personal characteristics are correlated with the choice of the health care plan and hospital utilization, then the estimated regression coefficients on the health plan when the dependent variable(s) is a measure of hospital utilization are likely to be biased upwards. If so, the true impact of HMOs on hospital utilization is likely to be smaller than that often reported in literature. For instance, among all the studies chosen by Miller and Luft in their 1994 review, only one used randomly selected control groups (Martin et al., 1989) . All other studies employed econometric techniques to control for selection bias. However, as Dowd et al. [1991] point out, it is unlikely that unobserved characteristics such as propensity to seek medical intervention at given levels of discomfort, across the FFS and HMO enrollees, can be controlled for easily.
It is important to point out that the studies mentioned above do not measure the effect of the growth of HMOs on overall hospital utilization, nor do they consider the competitive effects of HMO growth. They compare hospital usage among FFS and HMO enrollees. Selection bias criticism not withstanding, the inferences drawn from the studies covered by Miller and Luft [1994] and the more recent results of Robinson [1996] have a common theme, i.e., that HMOs are significantly responsible for a decline in hospital utilization -length of stay, occupancy rates, staffed beds, admissions, inpatient days, outpatient visits -and, that they are also responsible for substituting inpatient activity with more outpatient services. This paper investigates the validity of such claims in the health care industry.
One study that stands out from the literature on managed care and hospital utilization is by Luft, Maerki, and Trauner [1986] . They consider the competitive effects of managed care in their case study of decline in hospital utilization in Rochester, New York, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota, and Hawaii. In all three areas they discuss hospital utilization before and after the entry of HMOs. They conclude, "Careful review of the available data often identifies internal inconsistencies and contradictions, but in none of the three sites is there a reduction in hospital use that is most plausibly attributed to HMO competition. Instead, the reported reductions are in each case attributable to other factors -including biases in data, long-term trends predating HMOs, indirect effects of other policy changes, and other forms of competition." [Luft, Maerki, and Trauner, 1986: pg. 625] 7(&+12/2*,&$/ &+$1*(
Since the second world war and while the insurance market was still largely dominated by traditional FFS plans, the adoption and diffusion of any life enhancing innovation was the norm, i.e., any new technology that increased the technical boundary of treatment regardless of its effects on direct or indirect costs was adopted (Weisbrod, 1991; Neumann and Weinstein, 1991; Holmes, 1992) . Rising health care expenditures brought about two institutional responses to contain costs, growth of HMOs and the introduction of PPS. This has led hospitals to become cautious about the type (and extent) of new technology that they adopt (Laubach, 1995) . In particular, fiscal pressures on hospitals favor the adoption of technologies that reduce direct or indirect costs, rather than those that enhance technical boundaries (Weisbrod, 1991; Moody, 1992; Gelijns and Rosenberg, 1994; Gelijns and Rosenberg, 1995 (Holmes,1992) . A conclusion of this literature is that as more cost efficient technology is adopted for outpatient services, more patients will be shifted from inpatient to ambulatory care.
In 1965, Title XVIII and Title XIX of the Social Security Act established Medicare and
Medicaid as an intervention to provide medical assistance to the elderly and the poor.
Medicare, which consists of two parts, Hospital Insurance (Part A) and Supplementary Hospital
Medical Insurance (Part B), prior to 1983, was reimbursed on a "reasonable cost" basis. Rising costs of health care prompted the introduction of the Prospective Payment System (PPS).
Under this system, hospitals are paid a predetermined amount based upon the patient's diagnosis within a "diagnosis related group" (DRG) for providing medical services during a patient's hospital stay. This payment, based on diagnosis, shifts the risk for managing hospital days to the hospital thus encouraging them to reduce days. 2 Since ambulatory charges are still reimbursed on a cost based system, there is an incentive to shift patient care there.
Early research showed that the immediate effect of PPS was a reduction in Medicare inpatient days, length of stay, and discharges, and an increase in outpatient visits (Sloan, Morrisey, and Valvona, 1988; Hadley, Zuckerman, and Feder, 1989) . However, some researchers found that PPS did not have an effect on some of the hospital utilization variables.
2 PPS payment formula is calculated using seven variables: base payment, DRG weight, labor costs, urban/rural location, indirect teaching costs, disproportionate share adjustments, and outlier status. In addition, base payment has an annual update factor. In 1984, the update factor was around 4% but fell below 2% by 1986. Since then, the update factor increased steadily reaching 4% again in 1990 and then started decreasing again. Also, see Hodkin and McGuire [1994] .
For example, DesHarnais, Chesney, and Fleming [1988] found that PPS did not reduce LOS but decreased Medicare discharges. Further, it is believed that PPS will not have a long term effect on reducing hospital utilization. Hadley, Zuckerman, and Feder [1989] found that hospitals that were in their second year of PPS in 1985 showed a smaller reduction in length of stay than the hospitals that were in their first year of PPS. Outpatient visits in hospitals that were in their second year of PPS also had a smaller increase than those hospitals that were in their first year of PPS. Their study concluded that PPS provided an initial rather than a continuing opportunity for profits to hospitals, and that after the initial years PPS would have no continued effect on reducing Medicare inpatient days and LOS, or on increasing ambulatory visits. Similarly, Muller [1993] found that PPS was effective in reducing hospital utilization during the first decade of its implementation, but at a reduced rate over time.
'$7$ , and (v) HMOs. The number of hospitals and other hospital utilization variables are only for short term general 5 They develop an algorithm to cluster counties into a group such that the distance between counties is minimized, where the distance is defined as 1 -total flow of hospital flows between the two counties divided by the total stays in the county with fewer stays. 6 The HMO enrollment data provided by Wholey, Feldman and Christanson [1995] is based on InterStudy Censuses (1985 to 1995), InterStudy reports on MSAs served by HMOs, and GHAA Directories (1988 to 1991) . The measure that they construct prorates the enrollment of an HMO over all the counties served by that HMO using county population as prorating weights. The information on an HMO's enrollment in an MSA comes from the survey report by InterStudy (1994 InterStudy ( , 1995 . Thus, in their measure, if an HMO operates in two counties with populations of 100,000 and 200,000 then 1/3 of the HMO's enrollment would be reported in the smaller of the two counties and 2/3 would be reported in the larger one. hospitals. 8 A complete list of all the variables and their definitions is given in Appendix 1, Table   A1 .
'(6&5,37,9( 67$7,67,&6 are moving to the outpatient domain. The decline in hospital utilization and the shift from inpatient to outpatient activity is accompanied by both an increase in the number of HMOs operating in the HSAs, and the total enrollment per 1000 people in the HMOs. Figure 1 shows the time trends for selected variables: Outpatient visits, total beds, total inpatient days, and total HMO enrollment in the U.S. (Note that the totals in Figure 1 are absolute totals, not totals divided by population.)
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
There is a lot of cross-sectional variation in the variables. Figure 1A in the appendix is a bar graph of (average 9 ) HMO enrollment per 100 by state. A detailed table giving the breakdown of HMO enrollment per 100 by state and year is also given in Table A2 in the 8 American Hospital Association defines Short Term General Hospitals as those hospitals that provide non-specialized general medical and surgical service and for which the majority of patients are admitted for fewer than 30 days. 9 For each state, the average is calculated over nine years, 1985-1993. appendix. As seen from Figure 1A , California has the largest number and highest proportion of people enrolled in HMOs (about 28 persons per 100), and Pennsylvania is about the median state (about 10 persons per 100). As a further comparison of cross-sectional differences For all regressions, there were two types of fixed effects: time invariant HSA-specific effects and time fixed effects. In addition to these fixed effects, an additional dummy variable was introduced for observations that did not have any HMOs for a given year. This variable was introduced to capture any systematic variation in the dependent variables that is associated with the HSAs with no HMOs. Coefficients were estimated for the following form otherwise it is 0. Last, Flag i t is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the number of HMOs in a given observation is 0, (i.e. Flag i t = 1 if X (HMO) i t = 0 ). U i t is the error term assumed to be un-correlated with the RHS variables. 10 Also, note that in the case of occupancy, beds per capita, and admissions per capita, Y is the log of these variables.
The OLS models should not be interpreted as necessarily implying causality between the independent and the dependent variables. The results estimate the amount of variation in the dependent variable that can be associated with any given independent variable. At the risk of repetition, the reader is cautioned that the regression models control for time-invariant HSA-specific effects with the 802 HSA dummies, and that the time fixed-effects are controlled for by the 8 time dummies, but any time-varying HSA-specific effects are not controlled for in the models. If there are any time-varying HSA-specific effects, they are in the error term (and may be correlated with the independent variables), and since they have not been controlled for, they may be a source of endogeneity in the regression models. Hence the models should not be interpreted as necessarily implying causality.
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The results of the OLS regressions (the coefficients and the t-values) and the analysis of variance are given in the appendix Table 2A . 12 The reported F-test in the analysis of variance is the joint F-test for all the RHS variables excluding the 802 HSA dummies. In Table   2A , "----" appears in cells where the squared term of an independent variable (given in rows)
was not used in the regression model for that particular dependent variable (given in columns).
Except for the dependent variables, (i) (log) of occupancy rates, and (ii) the ratio of inpatient days to outpatient visits, the "fits" were reasonable. The models explain 43% of the variation in log of occupancy rates; 69% of variation in outpatient visits per capita; 67.3% of the variation in inpatient days per capita; 70.2% of the variation in log of admissions per capita; 75.3% of the variation in log of beds per capita; 63% of the variation in the ratio of admissions to outpatient visits, and 38.9% of the variation in the ratio of inpatient days to outpatient visits.
11 Technically, the interaction term between the HSA dummies and the time dummies, HSA j * (f(time)) , may be present in the RHS variables in the "true" model. Since we have "omitted" this term from RHS, it is present in the error term and if correlated with the rest of the independent variables, may cause endogeneity in the regression model. An example of this might be that HMOs selectively enter HSAs with low hospital utilization which has been changing over time within HSAs. 12 Analysis of variance and the t-statistic for the regression coefficients are adjusted for the loss of another 802 degrees of freedom for the HSA-specific effects which are not accounted for when estimating the regression coefficients on de-meaned data. See footnote 10.
In the HMO-related variables in Table 2A , note that the coefficient on the dummy variable for no HMOs (FLAG1), never has an absolute t-statistic greater than 1.94 except in the case of the dependent variable inpatient days per capita, where the t-statistic is 2.68. In this case the coefficient is positive, i.e., inpatient days per capita are higher in HSAs with no HMOs.
This finding is consistent with traditional wisdom.
13 Looking at the coefficients on the number of HMOs and HMO enrollment, it is not clear from this table alone what their association is with the dependent variable(s) since the squared term and the interaction terms were included in the regressions. To help understand the relationship of these (and other independent variables) to the dependent variables, Table 2 provides the calculated elasticities and changes in the level of dependent variables associated with a unit change in the independent variables. Note that in Table 2 , the calculated elasticities and changes are for the levels of occupancy rate, admissions per capita and beds per capita and not the logs of these variables. For all dependent variables, where necessary, the elasticities and change in levels are calculated at the sample means. An asterisk (*) implies that the joint F-test for an explanatory variable and it's square had a p-value less than 0.05.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The pattern seen in Table 2 is that the coefficient of correlation on the HMO variables has the "correct" sign (i.e., the one suggested by conventional wisdom), but is often not statistically significant. Also, the magnitude of the coefficient is "small" compared to the coefficients on some of the other variables (the magnitude is analyzed systematically in the next 13 Though the t-statistic is not greater than 1.94 for the other six dependent variables, it is interesting to note the sign of the coefficients, which are positive in the case of (log of) occupancy, (log of) admissions per capita, and (log of) beds per capita, and negative for outpatient visits per capita and ratio of admissions to outpatient visits. The signs on these coefficients are also consistent with traditional wisdom. section). For instance, results that show that an increase in HMOs is associated with an increase in admissions and a decrease in outpatient visits). Note also that whereas independently, neither the increase in admissions per capita, nor the decrease in outpatient visits per capita had a p-value less than 0.05, the ratio of the two has a p-value less than 0.05. Similarly, the ratio of inpatient days to outpatient visits also increases as either the number of HMOs increase, or the HMO enrollment per 1000 increases (but the p-value is not less than 0.05). Since individually, HMOs are associated with a decrease in both the inpatient days per capita as well as outpatient visits per capita, an increase in the ratio suggests that a larger decrease in inpatient days is associated with an increase in HMOs compared with the decrease in outpatient visits. Thus, the increase in the number and enrollment of HMOs is associated with an overall decrease in hospital utilization variables (inpatient days, outpatient visits, etc.) and a shift from inpatient to outpatient activity. Further, note that except in the case of ratio of admissions to outpatient visits, and beds per capita, the HMO variables (number and enrollment per 1000) were not statistically significant. The variable "Flag1" is also never statistically significant except in the case of inpatient days per capita. Lastly, note that most of the values appearing in the column under occupancy are not marked by an asterisk, whereas most of the values in the columns for beds per capita as well as inpatient days per capita are marked by asterisks.
The picture that emerges by looking at Table 2 is that a single HMO in a market does not reduce hospital utilization in any significant way. One anomalous result of Table 2 is that a unit increase in either the number of HMOs or HMO enrollment per 1000 is associated with an increase in admissions per capita. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the p-value is not less than 0.05. As for the occupancy rates, neither HMO-related variables, nor any of the other variables used in the OLS regression seem to explain much variation in occupancy rates. This is evidenced from both the small number of asterisks appearing in the column for occupancy rates, as well as the joint F-test for the non HSA-specific variables reported in the analysis of variance.
The most striking effect on the change in levels of the dependent variables is of the The four basic scenarios were computed at three levels each: for the entire U.S., California, and Pennsylvania. 14 The results of these scenarios are provided in Figure 3 . For comparison, the actual values of the (average) dependent variables for the U.S., California (CA) and Pennsylvania (PA) are also graphed. Note that the scenarios are provided for Inpatient days per capita, beds per capita, and occupancy rates and not the log of these variables. For the sake of brevity, scenarios for the remaining dependent variables are given in appendix in table 3A. In Figure 3 , the first column is for the U.S. and the second column for the two selected states.
[ Figure 3 about Here]
Observe that even though HMO penetration increased between 1985 and 1993 (for example, HMO enrollment per 1000 increased by about 150% and HSAs with no HMOs decreased by 63% (see Table1) ), the actual hospital inpatient days per capita is not very different from the forecast hospital days per capita at 1985 and 1993 HMO levels (Figure 3.1a) .
Further, as shown in Figure 3 .1a, hospital days per capita would have decreased the least if HMO penetration had remained at its 1985 levels and would have decreased the most at the California HMO levels. In Figure 3 .1b, observe that the actual hospital days per capita in Pennsylvania are more than the actual days per capita in California. Although this difference would have been less if their HMO levels were switched, it would not have disappeared 14 The choice of the states was based primarily on the rank order position of these states on the average HMO enrollment per capita as shown in Figure 2 in the text: California ranking number one and Pennsylvania as approximately the median state.
completely. In fact, as figure 3.1b shows, switching the HMO levels between California and Pennsylvania would have left the hospital days per capita in the two states virtually the same.
Similarly, Figures 3.3a and 3 .3b compare the actual and forecast occupancy rates for the U.S. and between California and Pennsylvania. A peak in occupancy rates is observed around 1990 (the average for the U.S. is around 57.5%). 15 The California occupancy rates fluctuate around 61% whereas Pennsylvania occupancy rates fluctuate around 68%. Further, observe that switching the HMO penetration levels between these two states has almost no effect on their occupancy rates. Comparing across the list of other dependent variables from Table 3A in the appendix, it is evident that that switching HMO levels between CA and PA has almost no effect on closing the gap in the utilization variables between the two states.
These scenarios illustrate one thing very clearly: differences in HMO penetration explain at most, a very modest share of the variation in the dependent variables. Thus, the traditional wisdom, which has typically credited the decline in hospital utilization levels to the emergence of HMOs, needs to be revisited.
These results raise the question, that if changes in HMO penetration are not associated in any empirically relevant way with variation in hospital utilization levels (inpatient days per capita, occupancy rates, admissions per capita, etc.) then what is substantially associated with these changes?
The scenarios in the previous section show that variation in HMO penetration levels is not substantially associated with variation in the dependent variables. In order to gain some insight about which factors are substantially associated with changes in the dependent variables, this section provides factor decomposition by variables and major groups for all seven dependent variables. In particular, this section quantifies the variation in a dependent variable that can be associated with a given independent variable. The years chosen for the factor decomposition analysis are 1985 and 1993, i.e., the results presented in this section account for the total variation between these two years using data regression coefficients estimated earlier from the entire data set.
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The reader is advised to keep in mind that in the case of occupancy rates, admissions per capita and beds per capita, the factor decomposition is for the log of these variables. Table   3 provides the amount of variation in a dependent variable that can be associated with a given variable. It also provides the variation in a dependent variable associated with any major group of factors. 17 An asterisk appears in the table when the joint F-test has a p-value less than 0.05. 16 Technically, factor decomposition between 1985 and 1993 amounts to calculating the percentage of the total change in the dependent variable that can be associated with any given independent variable. Thus, for example, if AFDC (X 1 ) and Square of AFDC (X 2 )were both used in the regression, and their estimated coefficients were β 1 and β 2 respectively, then the percentage change in Y due to AFDC is
where ∆ refers to the change in the variable between the chosen years. 17 Classification of variables by major groups, and the names of these 'major' groups is somewhat arbitrary. For instance, this paper refers to the variables, non-surgeons, surgeons and teaching MDs as "Physicians", and to the number of hospitals as "Hospitals". Another equally suitable classification may have been "Supply side Factors" which would be a composite of all the variables in the "Physician" and the "Hospitals" groups. The point is that since (i) the regression models were linear in parameters (though not in variables), and (ii) Table [4] provides breakdown by variables after taking into account the squared terms, the readers can easily adjust the results to their own a priori classifications, e.g., say the "Supply side factors".
Thus, an asterisk in front of "TOTAL" for the demographic group implies that the p-value in a joint F-test for the four variables, births per 1000, HSA population and their squares, was less than 0.05. Figure 4 provides graphical results of Table 3 for Inpatient days per capita by major groups. The graphs for the remaining dependent variables are given in the appendix in Figure   4A .
[TABLE 3 and FIGURE 4 about Here] Table 3 shows that between 1985 and 1993, Inpatient days per capita decreased by 9.02%, and of this total decrease, HMOs contributed 20.65%. Similarly, as log of occupancy increased by 2.65% (i.e., when occupancy decreased by 0.79%), HMOs offset the increase in log of occupancy rates by 10.85%. Outpatient visits per capita increased by 71.41% and the net effect of HMOs was to offset this increase by 1.36%. Log of admissions per capita increased by 10.96% (admissions per capita decreased by 18.66%) and HMOs contributed towards the increase in log of admissions per capita by only 0.51% (i.e., HMOs offset the increase in admissions per capita). Similarly, log of beds per capita increased by 2.56% (beds per capita decreased by 9.56%) and HMOs offset the increase in log of beds per capita by 11.22% (i.e., contributed towards an overall decrease in beds per capita). Similar interpretations should be made for the two ratio measures, admissions to outpatient visits and inpatient days to outpatient visits.
The numerical results are consistent with the findings in the scenarios section, as well as the elasticity results in Table 2 . However, the calculations in Table 3 clearly show that the variation in the dependent variables is not substantially associated with HMO-related variables.
In fact, yearly fixed effects (labeled as "time" in Table 3 and Figure 4A ) explain the largest amount of variation in the dependent variables. The bar graphs in Figure 4A show that the group labeled "social and economic factors" ranks second in explaining the amount of variation
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Page 22 in all the dependent variables, except for the log of occupancy rates and the ratio of inpatient days to outpatient visits. The group labeled "hospitals" 18 ranks second in explaining the variation in the log of occupancy rates. Further, hospitals rank as number three (or higher) in explaining the amount of variation in all dependent variables except in the two ratio measures of inpatient versus outpatient activities. Ranking different groups of variables in this way shows that HMOs are not the most important group of variables in explaining the amount of variation in the dependent variables. In fact, yearly fixed effects, social and economic factors and even the number of hospitals are more important.
The main findings of this section are that neither the changes in hospital utilization rates (hospital days per capita, occupancy rates, admissions per capita etc.), nor the shift from inpatient to ambulatory activity in hospitals are strongly associated with changes in HMO penetration levels in the U.S. Yearly fixed effects explain the most amount of variation in hospital utilization and shift from inpatient to outpatient activity. As Table 3 shows, time fixed effects account for -125.87% of the total (-9.02%) decrease in inpatient days per capita between 1985 and 1993. Similarly, 94.28% of the total (71.41%) increase in outpatient visits per capita is associated with time fixed effects.
The results indicate that decision makers who are interested in forecasting hospital demand need to focus more on social and economic, demographic and other time varying factors in their local markets, rather than the growth of HMOs. Similarly, policy makers may need to reevaluate the long term effects of time varying factors on hospital use rather than assuming that it is necessarily the growth of managed care that is responsible for the decline in utilization.
To the extent that the decline in hospital utilization is strongly associated with variation in time varying factors, only further research can explain what these factors may be and how they effect utilization. One plausible speculation is that the introduction of PPS and the rapid growth of HMOs changed the types of technology that hospitals would adopt, thus bringing about changes in utilization. The adoption and diffusion of cost reducing technologies is in sharp contrast to life enhancing technologies of the pre-PPS era [Weisbrod, 1991] . An example of such a technology would be the widespread use of less invasive and less expensive laparoscopic cholecystectomy by 1991, used for the treatment of gall-bladder disease [Parente, Gaynor and Bass, 1996] . Use of cost-efficient and less invasive technologies decreased hospital admissions, hospital days and directed more patients towards the outpatient domain.
In turn it lead to an increase in the average length of stay because, for instance, patients for whom less invasive surgery was available, were shifted to ambulatory services leaving behind a pool of patients who required more invasive procedures.
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This paper analyzes hospital utilization data on short term general hospitals in the U.S. Table 3 Figure Data were not available for some variables for certain years. These missing observations were interpolated using simple methods. All interpolations were done at the county level, before aggregating up to the HSA levels. For Teaching MDs, Patient Care MDs and Surgeons, observations were not available for 1987 and 1991. These observations were estimated using a simple average from the surrounding years. For example, Teaching MDs for 1987 for a given county were calculated as the average of the teaching MDs in that county in 1986 and 1988. Similarly, population estimates for 1989 were computed as the simple average of the estimate of 1988 and the census figure for 1990.
Tables and Figures
Medicare Enrollment (part A and/or B) was not available for 1992 and 1993. This was estimated by a slightly different method. For each county, the ratio of Medicare enrollment to population over age 65 was computed for 1991. This ratio was multiplied by the population over age 65 in 1992 (1993) to get an estimate of Medicare enrollment for 1992 (1993) for each county.
Birthrates for 1993 were also missing and were calculated using simple exponential smoothing for each county using it's data from 1985 through 1992.
19 Last, data for unemployment rates for 1993 were also estimated. Since unemployment rates are subject to erratic changes, a slightly more sophisticated approach was used. First, data were obtained for unemployment rates for years 1985 through 1993 at the state level. Then, for each county and year from 1985 through 1992, the ratio of county to state unemployment rate was calculated. This ratio was forecast (using exponential smoothing) for 1993. The forecast value of the ratio (for each county) was then multiplied by the actual 1993 state level unemployment rate to get an estimate of county unemployment for 1993. 
